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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertis-
ing in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles. It transmits relevant
information to otherwise uninformed consumers and it acts as a price discrimination de-
vice. We look at the rmsoptimal advertising and pricing decisions in two settings, namely
mass advertising/non-discrimination strategies and targeted advertising/price discrimination
strategies. In the case of targeted advertising, we show that rms advertise more in its weak
market than in its strong market. The analysis highlights that targeted advertising might
constitute a tool to dampen price competition. We show that average prices with mass
advertising/non-discrimination can be below those with targeted advertising/price discrimi-
nation (regardless of the market segment). We also nd that, when advertising costs are not
too high, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry prots
at the expense of consumer and overall welfare. Finally, we show that overall welfare and
consumer surplus falls when rms use targeted advertising instead of mass advertising.
1 Introduction
In many markets rms invest in advertising to create awareness for products, prices and spe-
cial o¤ers. The informative view of advertising claims that the primary role of advertising is to
transmit information about (new) productsexistence and/or price to otherwise uninformed con-
sumers.1 Until very recently, the scope of targeted advertising was relatively limited and rms
advertising strategies were mostly tailored to traditional media and mass audiences. However,
Thanks for comments on early versions of this paper are due to Rabah Amir, Simon Anderson, Roberto Bur-
guet, João Correia-da-Silva, Anthony Dukes, Matthew Ellman, Jean Gabszewicz, Sjaak Hurkens, Didier Laussel,
Xavier Martínez-Giralt, José Moraga-Gonzalez, Frank Page, Martin Peitz, Emmanuel Petrakis, Pedro Pita Barros,
Régis Renault and Rune Stenbacka. Financial support from the Portuguese Science Foundation is also gratefully
acknowledged. Any errors are our own responsability. The usual disclaimer applies.
1The persuasive view of advertising holds that the main role of advertising is to increase a consumers willingness
to pay for the advertised product and/or change the consumerstastes. Advertising therefore increases product
di¤erentiation and consumersbrand loyalty. For a review of models in the persuasive view of advertising see
Bagwells (2003) comprehensive survey on the The Economic Analysis of Advertising.
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the increasing use of the Internet, smartphones and tablets coupled with the development of
sophisticated methods for tracking and analysing detailed information about consumers are
challenging conventional wisdom regarding retailersadvertising and pricing strategies.2 This
allows advertising content to vary according to the consumer viewing it and increases the scope
for targeted advertising and pricing.3
Although economists have long been concerned in understanding the prot and welfare e¤ects
of price discrimination and advertising separately, little is known to date about the competitive
and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination enabled by targeted advertising. In fact, there are
interactions between price discrimination and targeted advertising that need to be taken into
account.
The main theme of this paper is, therefore, to investigate how the availability of targeted
technologies may a¤ect the rmsadvertising and pricing choices to di¤erent segments of the
market and the corresponding level of prots, consumerssurplus and social welfare. Put di¤er-
ently, the paper aims to nd an answer to the following question: Who are the winners and the
losers when retailers move from mass advertising/uniform pricing to targeted advertising/price
discrimination?
With this goal in mind, the paper proposes a static game of duopoly competition with two
rms, A and B, o¤ering their goods directly to consumers and investing in advertising to create
awareness.4 We suppose that the set of potential buyers is composed of two distinct segments
of equal mass, namely segment a and segment b: Consumers in segment i prefer product i over
product j by a degree equal to  > 0. This parameter measures the degree of a consumers
preference towards one of the rms (e.g., due to brand preference, location, switching costs). As
in Stahl (1994) a potential consumer cannot be an actual buyer unless rms invest in advertising.
Thus, by investing in advertising rms endogenously segment the market into captive (partially
informed), selective (fully informed) and uninformed customers.
Two advertising strategies are analyzed in this paper. We rst consider the case in which
retailers use a mass advertising campaign. In this case, they choose an advertising reach to
the entire market and all the ads have the same content. Specically, we assume that all ads
quote the same price, thereby retailers follow a uniform pricing policy. We then consider the
case where retailers can use a targeted advertising campaign instead. In this case rm i chooses
an advertising intensity to the strong group of consumers (segment i) and to the weak group of
consumers (segment j). Ads tailored to di¤erent segments may quote di¤erent prices, implying
that rms can engage in price discrimination through the use of targeted advertising.
2See, Anderson (2012) for an analysis of the economics of advertising and the internet.
3A Wall Street Journal investigation found that the Staples website displays di¤erent prices to people after
tracking their locations. More than that, Staples appeared to consider the persons distance from a competitors
physical store. If a competitor had stores within 20 miles or so, Staples.com usually showed a discounted price.
See this story on http://classroom.wsj.com/cre/2013/03/01/a-complex-web/
4 It is worth noting that the scope of our model is not restricted to the study of competition between new
products. It can also be useful to understand rms strategic interaction (concerning pricing and advertising
choices) when they are competing for new consumers, who are not aware of the products/services and their
prices.
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The model addressed in this paper ts well advertising and pricing policies that are nowadays
possible through the use of mobile devices. With the smartphone population growing each day,5
rms can now connect with consumers at the right place and the right time and with the right
message, in a manner that was not previously possible.6 As an illustrative example consider
the case of a consumer who is standing in front of a certain store (e.g. a co¤ee shop), using a
mobile application that incorporates location based advertising.7 If the co¤ee shop has access
to location based advertising tools, it is able to know that this potential customer is actually
standing in front of its door and send him/her a relevant advertising message. Evidently, the
consumer may also be tracked by other co¤ee shops in the neighbourhood. For example, the
co¤ee shop down the street, knowing that the potential customer is closer to its competitor,
may send him/her a compelling advertising message with a special shopping o¤er (discounts or
other rewards). If the last ad is compelling enough, it can entice consumers to travel to the
more distant store.8 This kind of advertising/pricing strategies have been recently employed by
stores and brands like Starbucks, Taco Bell, Tasti-D-Lite, Macys and Pepsi.9
Similarly, the CEO of the New York City-based startup PlaceIQ said recently that PlaceIQ
can be used to lure potential customers away from a competitors location. Through the use of
this technology, Lexus could potentially identify mobile phone users at an Audi dealership and
serve them a mobile ad directing them to the nearest Lexus lot.10 ;11
This paper o¤ers new insights to the literature on price discrimination based on customer
recognition. First, in contrast to the usual nding that price discrimination reduces all segment
prices, we nd that moving from mass advertising/non-discrimination can raise average prices.
Second, we nd that price discrimination by means of targeted advertising does not necessarily
5 In November 2012 Comscore announced that the US smartphone market had passed the 50% penetration
threshold. It also announced that EU5 markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK) were reporting a 55%
smartphone penetration. See http://www.comscore.com. Moreover, according to eMarketers forecast, more than
70 percent of all cell phones in these countries will be smartphones by the end of 2016.
6According to a recent survey, eMarketer estimates that mobile ad spending will increase from $8.4 billion in
2012 to almost $37 billion in 2016. See http://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckjones/2013/01/04/mobile-ad-spending-
forecast-to-increase-4x-over-the-next-4-years/
7Location-based advertising (also know as hyper-local advertising) is a type of advertising which takes ad-
vantage of a consumers real world position. Using this real world position, location-based advertising is able to
deliver relevant ads for products and services that are in close proximity to consumerscurrent location.
8See this story on http://www.acquisio.com/marketing-101/understanding-location-based-advertising/
9Taco Bell fast food chain sends special o¤ers to people using a mobile app when they are in the gen-
eral vicinity of a Taco Bell. The goal is to to drive tra¢ c to its locations, as well as to promote its
new product. See http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/taco-bell-taps-mobile-to-drive-in-store-tra¢ c-for-new-
doritos-cool-ranch-tacos
and http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57579746-94/location-information-to-make-mobile-ads-more-valuable/
10See http://adage.com/article/digital/smg-track-mobile-ads-lead-store-visits/240661/
11For instance, CBS News reports that nowadays it is possible to analyse the recent movements of a mobile
device user among stores in a shopping mall, and to predict whether a particular store will be the next destination
for the mobile device user. If, say, restaurant A is more likely to be visited than restaurant B, di¤erent o¤ers can
be sent by the two restaurants to that mobile device user. It also states that mobile device users attending a large
venue may be tracked and provided coupons for the vendors that they are more likely to pass based on their recent
travel patterns in and around the venue. See http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-57342567/amazon-big-
brother-patent-knows-where-youll-go/
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lead to the classic prisoner dilemma result that usually arises in markets exhibiting best-response
asymmetry12 and full informed consumers. Specically, we show that, at least when advertising
is not too expensive, prots with targeted advertising/price discrimination are above their mass
advertising counterparts. Third, when advertising costs are not too high, we show that price
discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry prots at the expense of
consumer surplus and welfare. Thus, the paper sheds light on the importance of taking into
account di¤erent forms of market competition when public policy tries to evaluate the prot
and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature on target advertising by shedding light
on the rmsadvertising strategies to each segment of the market. An interesting nding of
the paper is that retailers may advertise less intensively to their strong market than to their
weak market. The reason is that under price discrimination rms may have an incentive to
strategically reduce the advertising intensity to be targeted to its strong market as a way to
induce the rival to play less aggressively in this segment.
Related literature The paper is mainly related to the literature on informative advertis-
ing13 and to the literature on price discrimination based on customer recognition. The literature
on informative targeted advertising is rather recent and it has been evolving along two major
lines. The rst line studies the e¤ects of targeted advertising technologies on prices and com-
petition when rms can directly target di¤erent consumers.14 The second line of the literature
assumes that rms are not able to directly target their messages to di¤erent groups of consumers,
taking into consideration the intermediary role played by media platforms.15 As we assume that
rms have the ability to directly target their ads to specic segments of consumers (which is
frequently the case in online and mobile markets), our paper is more closely related to the rst
line of the literature, particularly to Iyer, et al. (2005), Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008)
and Brahim, et al. (2011).
Iyer, et al. (2005) develop a model of targeted advertising in which price discrimination
can be employed. Each rm has an exogenous captive segment of consumers, who cannot be
induced to switch, and they compete for the remaining selective consumers, who buy from the
rm o¤ering the best deal. In their model, when rms decide to advertise their product to
a specic segment, all consumers in that segment become fully informed. In contrast, in the
present paper, consumers are endogenously segmented into captive or selective due to rms
advertising choices. Even though rms may have some advantage over their competitors due to
; conditional on being fully informed, in our model, any consumer may be induced to switch,
12Corts (1998) refers that the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one rms strongmarket is the
others weakmarket. A market is designated as strong if in comparison to uniform pricing a rm wishes to
increase its price there. The market is said to be weak if the reverse happens.
13A good survey on the economics of advertising can be found on Bagwell (2005).
14See for example, Roy (2000), Iyer, et al (2005); Esteban, et al. (2006); Esteban and Hernández (2007);
Galeotti and Moraga-González (2008) and Brahim, et al. (2011).
15See for example, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), Chandra (2009); Athey and Gans (2009); Gal-Or and Gal-Or
(2005); Gal-Or and Gal-Or (2006); Gal-Or, Gal-Or, May and Spangler (2006), among others.
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which is not the case in Iyer, et al. (2005). They conclude that targeted advertising leads to
higher prots in relation to mass advertising independent of price discrimination being used.
Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) look at the rmsadvertising and pricing strategies in
a homogeneous product market where segmentation is based on consumer attributes that are
completely unrelated to tastes. The paper compares market outcomes under mass advertising
with uniform pricing and targeted advertising with price discrimination. Assuming that one
market segment is exogenously more protable then the other, the paper shows that the pos-
sibility of market segmentation may lead to positive prots within an otherwise Bertrand-like
setting. In this paper, an increase in advertising costs increases the protability of market seg-
mentation with rms having unequal sizes. Regarding pricing strategies they nd that, with
targeted advertising, the price distribution of the less attractive market dominates (in the sense
of rst order stochastic dominance) the price distribution of the other market. The price distri-
bution under mass advertising is in-between these two distributions (again, in the sense of rst
order stochastic dominance).
Brahim, et al. (2011) investigate the prot e¤ects of targeted advertising in a Hotelling
competition model with no price discrimination. They show that rms advertise more intensively
in their strong markets than in their weak markets. They show that targeted advertising can
reduce rmsprots. Although in their model price discrimination is not permitted they argue
that if price discrimination were possible the negative e¤ects of targeted advertising on prots
would still be present.
The paper is also related to the literature on competitive price discrimination with customer
recognition.16 In these models it is generally the case that the market exhibits best-response
asymmetry, and prot typically decreases with price discrimination. Thisse and Vives (1988)
provide a useful model for the understanding of the prot e¤ects of price discrimination in these
markets. They consider two rms located at the extremes of the segment [0; 1] ; with consumers
uniformly distributed in this line segment. Firms can observe the location (or brand preference)
of each individual consumer and price accordingly. The strong (close) market for one rm is
the weak (distant) market for the other rm. In this setting they show that each consumers
location is a market to be contested, price discrimination intensies competition, and prices and
prots fall down. Consequently, rms face a prisoners dilemma.17 Price discrimination based
on customer recognition has also been examined by Bester and Petrakis (1996), Chen (1997),
Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003), Esteves (2010) and Gehrig, et al.
(2011), (2012).18 In all of these approaches consumers are perfectly informed about products and
16Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present literature surveys on price
discrimination with customer recognition.
17Esteves (2009b) extends the Thisse and Vives model to a two-dimensional di¤erentiation model and shows
that price discrimination might not necessarily lead to the prisoners dilemma result. This happens when rms
observe the location of consumers in the less di¤erentiation dimension and price discriminate accordingly while
they remain ignorant about their location in the more di¤erentiated dimension.
18For other recent papers on price discrimination and customer recognition see also Chen and Pearcy (2010),
Esteves and Vasconcelos (2012), Esteves and Regiani (2012), Ghose and Huang (2006), Ouksel and Eruysal (2011),
Shy and Stenbacka (2012).
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prices, there is no role for advertising and prots fall with price discrimination. Esteves (2009a)
departs from this hypothesis by assuming that advertising is needed to create awareness for a rm
product. She investigates the e¤ects of price discrimination in an informative advertising model.
There are important di¤erences between Esteves (2009a) and the present paper with regard
to the timing of the game and the model assumptions. Esteves (2009a) proposes a two-period
model with two rms launching an homogeneous product. In period one rms choose a mass
advertising intensity and a uniform price to the entire market. Since advertising endogenously
segments the market into captive and price sensitive consumers, by observing the consumers
previous shopping decisions, in the second period, rms can distinguish a selective from a captive
consumer and price accordingly. She shows that only one of the rms will have information to
employ price discrimination. As a result of that, she shows that all rms might become better
o¤ with price discrimination.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of
the model. Section 3 analyses the benchmark case in which rms employ a mass advertising
technology that forces them to adopt a uniform pricing policy. Section 4 analyses the equilibrium
advertising and pricing strategies when rms can price discriminate through the use of perfect
targeted advertising. Section 5 stresses the competitive e¤ects of targeted advertising with price
discrimination. Section 6 focus on the impact of targeted advertising on social welfare. Finally,
Section 7 concludes and an appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text.
2 Model Assumptions
Consider a market with two rms, i = A;B: Each rm is launching a new good, produced at a
constant marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero without loss of generality.19 On the demand
side, there is a unit mass of consumers, each of whom wishes to buy a single unit of either good
A or B. Consumers have a common reservation price v and they are initially uninformed about
the existence and the price of the good. As in Stahl (1994) a potential consumer cannot be an
actual buyer unless rms invest in advertising.20 ;21 We suppose that the set of potential buyers
is composed of two distinct segments of equal mass, segment a and segment b: Consumers in
segment i prefer product i over product j by a degree equal to  > 0. As in Shilony (1977), Raju,
et al. (1990) and Esteves (2010),  can be dened as a measure of the degree of a consumers
preference towards his favorite product.22 It can also be conceived as the minimum di¤erence
between the prices of the two competing products necessary to induce consumers to buy the
19The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results derived
throughout the model.
20 Implicitly it is assumed that search costs are prohibitively high for new products.
21Other papers addressing informative advertising (with mass advertising technologies) are, for example, Butters
(1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stegeman (1991).
22Even though the paper considers that the market is segmented according to brand preference, the model also
accommodates other interpretations for the parameter ; such as search costs, transportation costs or switch-
ing costs. For example, in a location model like Shilony (1977) consumers can purchase costlessly from the
neigbourhood rm but they incur a transport cost if they go to the more distant rm.
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least preferred product. In other words, consumers in segment i buy product i as long as its
price is not undercut by more than  by rm j: As a result, each rm has a strong and a weak
segment of consumers. For rm A, for instance, segment a is its strong segment, while segment
b is its weak segment.
Although consumers are endowed with preferences over brands, without advertising they
have no information about which products exist, their characteristics and price. By conveying
information to otherwise uninformed consumers, advertising is a key element in generating
demand for a product.
The game is static and proceeds as follows. Firms choose advertising intensities and prices
simultaneously and non-cooperatively. The advertising messages of each rm contain truthful23
and complete information about the existence and the price of its product. After rms have
sent their ads independently, the potential demand of each rm is made of a group of captive
customers and a group of selective customers.24 Selective consumers receive ads from both rms;
they buy from the rm o¤ering them the highest surplus. Captive consumers receive ads from
only one of the rms. Therefore, they purchase from the only known rm as long as the full
price25 is below v.
Advertising is a costly activity for rms. The advertising technology is exogenously given
and it is the same for both rms. Two advertising technologies will be studied throughout this
paper, a mass advertising technology (Section 3) and a targeted advertising technology (Section
4).
When rms use a mass advertising technology, they send the same message to all consumers
in the market and so they are forced to follow a uniform pricing policy. All the ads quote
the same price. In this case, the problem of rm i consists in choosing an optimal advertising
reach, i; and the corresponding uniform pricing strategy pi; i = A;B: The cost of reaching
a fraction  of consumers is given by the function A() =  () : Following the literature on
informative advertising (e.g. Butters (1977) and Tirole (1988)), it is assumed that the cost of
reaching consumers increases at an increasing rate. This can be formally written as A > 0
and A  0.26 The latter condition means that it is increasingly more expensive to inform an
additional customer or, likewise, to reach a higher proportion of customers. It is also assumed
that there are no xed costs in advertising, i.e. A(0) = 0: The quadratic technology proposed
in Tirole (1988) is not based upon an underlying technology of message production. However,
it has the advantage of being extremely simple to manipulate algebraically. It is given by
A() =  () = 2: Since in the present model there is a large number of buyers, normalized
to one,  can be identied with the cost per ad. In what follows, whenever a functional form is
needed, we will use the quadratic technology.
23 In the USA, for instance, the FTC prohibits advertisers from making false and deceptive statements about
their products (see www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/ad-faqs.htm).
24The remaining consumers receive no ad from either rm. They are uninformed and excluded from the market.
25Consider, for instance, the case of a consumer in segment a: The full price of good A coincides with the price
quoted by rm A, whereas the full price of good B is given by the sum of  and the price quoted by rm B: The
same analysis applies, mutatis mutandis for consumers in segment b:
26Subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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When rms are able to use targeted advertising, they can target ads to specic segments of
the market. This amounts to say that each rm may send two types of ads: ads targeted to the
strong segment of consumers (those who prefer its own product) and ads targeted to the weak
group of consumers (those who prefer the rivals product). Within each segment, messages are
randomly distributed among consumers. Since ads targeted to di¤erent segments of the market
can quote di¤erent prices, targeted advertising can also be used as an e¤ective tool for price
discrimination. In this set-up, the problem of rms consists in choosing an optimal advertising
reach and an optimal pricing strategy to each segment of the market. The advertising intensities
oi and 
r
i respectively denote the advertising reach of rm i in its own (strong) market and rm
is advertising reach targeted to the rivals market (rm i0s weak market). Ads targeted to each
segment will have di¤erent prices, respectively given by poi and p
r
i ; i = A;B. In line with Iyer,
et al. (2005), Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) and Brahim, et al. (2011), we assume that
(i) the advertising cost function is additive separable in oi and 
r
i and, (ii) the cost of reaching
a fraction ki of consumers, k = fo; rg, is given by the quadratic function A(ki ) = 
 
ki
2
:
3 Mass advertising
This section investigates optimal pricing and advertising strategies when rms use a mass ad-
vertising technology and follow a uniform pricing policy. There are two components to rm is
strategy: its advertising level (denoted by i) and its price (denoted by pi).
After rms have sent their ads independently, a proportion i and j of customers is reached
by rm i and js advertising, respectively. In each segment of the market rm i has a fraction
i
 
1  j

of captive customers, who are only aware of its product and a fraction ij of selective
consumers, who are fully informed about the existence and the price of both products.
Consider rst the case of selective consumers. In segment a they compare the net utility of
purchasing good A at price pA; v   pA; with the net utility of purchasing good B at price pB;
v      pB: Considering pi  v   ; i = A;B; we have that a selective consumer in segment a
buys good A if and only if pA     pB: Analogously, a selective consumer in segment b buys
good A if and only if pA +  < pB: Similar reasoning is applied to obtain the conditions under
which di¤erent types of selective consumers buy good B.
As far as concerns the behavior of captive consumers, a captive consumer to rm A in
segment a; buys its good if pA  v: If instead the captive consumer belongs to segment b; he
only buys good A when pA  v   .
Firm is demand when rms use a mass advertising technology, Di; is then equal to:
Di (pi; pj) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if pi > v
1
2i
 
1  j

if pj +  < v    < pi  v
1
2i
 
1  j

+ 12ij if v    < pj +  < pi  v
i
 
1  j

if pj +  < pi  v   
i
 
1  j

+ 12ij if pj     pi < pj +   v   
i
 
1  j

+ ij if 0  pi < pj   
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Firm is prots is equal to
i = piDi (pi; pj) A (i) : (1)
3.1 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we study the equilibrium price and advertising strategies. Our analysis is focused
on the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Given the rivals strategies, j and pj ; the problem of rm
i consists of choosing the advertising intensity, i, and the pricing policy, pi that maximize its
prot.
Proposition 1 (i) The prices (v; v) and the advertising intensities
 
v
4 ;
v
4

constitute a
symmetric Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies when v  2 and  > v4 :
(ii) The prices (v   ; v   ) and the advertising intensities

2(v )
v +4 ;
2(v )
v +4

constitute a
symmetric Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies when v > 2 and  > max
n
v(v )
4(v 2) ;
(v 2)(v )
4
o
:
(iii) When v > 2 and  < max
n
v(v )
4(v 2) ;
(v 2)(v )
4
o
there is no symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in prices.
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Proposition 1 it follows that when v is su¢ ciently large, and  is small enough, there
is no symmetric price equilibrium in pure strategies. The intuition behind this result is the
following. If advertising is cheap enough (small ), selective consumers have a non-negligible
impact on rmsprots. As long as v is su¢ ciently high, the existence of a positive fraction
of selective consumers with a preference for the rival rm creates a tension between the rms
incentives to price low in order to attract consumers belonging to its weak market and the rms
incentives to price high in order to extract rents from consumers belonging to its strong market.
In equilibrium each rm follows a mixed pricing strategy as an attempt to prevent the rival from
systematically predicting its price, which in turn makes undercutting less likely.
Lemma 1. When v > 2 and  < max
n
v(v )
4(v 2) ;
(v 2)(v )
4
o
rms will have incentives to
compete for all the selective consumers in the market.
Lemma 1 states that rms compete for all the selective consumers when v > 2 and  <
max
n
v(v )
4(v 2) ;
(v 2)(v )
4
o
: When case (i) in Proposition 1 occurs, both rms quote price v;
choosing to be a monopolist in its strong market. When case (ii) in Proposition 1 holds, both
rms quote price v   : Firms serve not only the consumers in its strong market but also the
captive consumers with a preference for the rivals brand. However, in this case, rms choose
not to compete for the weak selective consumers who always buy their most preferred brand. In
contrast, if the conditions in Lemma 1 hold each rm will have incentives to serve not only the
selective consumers in its strong market but also the selective consumers in its weak market.
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As we are interested in studying the competitive e¤ects of targeted advertising and price
discrimination in the remainder of the paper we will concentrate on the range of prices for which
rms compete for all consumers in the market, i.e. p  v   :27
Proposition 2 below characterizes the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium when Lemma
1 holds, pointing out the conditions under which such equilibrium exists. Suppose that rm j
randomly selects a price from the c.d.f (cumulative distribution function), Fj(p): In a symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium, both rms follow the same pricing strategy, thus, for the sake of
simplicity write Fi(p) = Fj(p) = F (p).
Regarding the group of selective consumers, when rm i charges price p; three events are
relevant. First, if pj > p +  rm i captures the whole group of selective consumers in
the market. This occurs with probability [1  F (p+ )] and yields a total revenue equal to
p

i
 
1  j

+ ij

: Second, rm i captures no selective consumer if pj < p : This happens
with probability F (p  ) : In this case rm i revenue comes only from its captive consumers,
being equal to pi
 
1  j

: Finally, each rm serves its group of strong selective consumers if
p   < pj < p+ . This event occurs with probability [F (p+ )  F (p  )] and yields a total
revenue equal to p

i
 
1  j

+ 12ij

: In that case, for a given i and j , rm is expected
prot, can be written as follows:
Ei = pi
 
1  j

+ pij

1  1
2
F (p+ )  1
2
F (p  )

 A(i):
In a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, for a given i and j ; any price chosen from a rms price
support should generate the same expected prot. Therefore:
pi
 
1  j

+ pij

1  1
2
Fj (p+ )  1
2
Fj (p  )

 A(i) = km  A(i):
Or, equivalently:
pi
 
1  j

+ pij

1  1
2
Fj (p+ )  1
2
Fj (p  )

= km:
The next proposition provides a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium in the
benchmark case in which rms use mass advertising technologies and cannot employ price dis-
crimination strategies.
Proposition 2. Given the conditions in Lemma 1, in the benchmark case where rms
follow a mass advertising campaign with no price discrimination:
(i) each rms price is randomly chosen from the c.d.f
Fm(p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p < pmin
1  2
(m)2
h
km
p+   m (1  m)
i
if pmin 5 p 5 pmax   
2  2
(m)2
h
km
p    m (1  m)
i
if pmax    5 p < pmax
1 if p = pmax
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
27The equilibrium results arising when p > v    are available from the authors upon request.
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with
pmax =
2km
m (2  m) + ;
pmin = pmax   2;
and
km =

2
(2  m)2

1 +
q
1 + (m)2 (2  m) 2

:
(ii) Each rm chooses an advertising reach m 2 [0; 1]; implicitly given by:
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = A (m) :
(iii) Each rm earns an overall expected prot of
Em = mA (
m) A (m) : (2)
Proof.
See the Appendix.
Remark 1. For the quadratic technology, rms compete for all consumers in the market
when:
(A1) : v >
p
2 + 3

;
(A2) :

 p
2 + 1

4
   (v   3) (v   )
8
:
Proof. See the Proof of Corollary 1.
Since we are interested in studying situations in which rms compete for all consumers in
the market, in the remainder of the paper we shall assume that, for the quadratic technology,
where A() = 2 the follow assumptiom holds:
Assumption 1. For the quadratic technology, we assume conditions (A1) and (A2) hold.
Under Assumption 1, when the advertising cost function is the quadratic one there is no
Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies and the mixed strategy equilibrium in prices is described in
Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. When assumptions (A1) and (A2) hold and A() = 2 each rm chooses
an advertising reach m 2 [0; 1]; equal to
m =
2
 
2 + 8
1=2
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
; (3)
from which we obtain:
pmax =
 
2 + 8
1=2
+ 
pmin = pmax   2
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and an overall expected prot equal to:
Em =
4
 
2 + 8
h
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
i2 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3. Each rm serves its group of strong selective customers with probability
qm 2 [0; 1] which is equal to
qm = 1  8 (k
m)2
(m)4
"
ln
 
(pmax   )2
pmax (pmax   2)
!
  1
(pmax   )2
#
:
For the quadratic advertising technology:
qm = 1  322

ln
 
8
+ 1

  1
 (8+ )

:
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Targeted advertising and price discrimination
This section investigates the rmsadvertising and pricing decisions when they have the possi-
bility to target ads with di¤erent price content to specic segments of the market. Now rm is
strategy is to choose the levels of advertising to be targeted to its own strong market and to the
rivals (rm is weak) market, respectively given by oi and 
r
i : The prices quoted in each type
of ads are respectively given by poi and p
r
i . Recall that o stands for rm i
0s own strong market,
while r stands for the rivals strong market (i.e. rm i0s weak market).
The rmstargeting ability is assumed to be perfect, i.e Pr(fall in i jtargeted to i) = 1 while
Pr(fall in i jtargeted to j) = 0: This means that there is no leakage of ads between the groups.28
Type a consumers are only aware of poA and prB; since the remaining prices namely prA and poB
are quoted in the ads targeted to type b consumers.
Again, in each segment of the market, potential consumers can be divided into captive,
selective and uninformed consumers. In segment i; after rms have sent their ads independently,
a proportion oi and 
r
j of customers is reached, respectively, by rm i and j advertising. Thus,
rm is demand in this market segment is made of a group of captive (locked-in) customers,
oi
 
1  rj

; and a group of selective customers, oi
r
j , i; j = A;B with i 6= j:
Look rst at rm A overall demand. Firm A0s sales in segment a (at price poA  v) are equal
to:
DoA =

1
2
oA (1  rB) +
1
2
oA
r
B Pr(p
o
A < p
r
B + )

28Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) and Brahim, et al. (2011) also assume that there is no leakage of ads
between segments.
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and rm A0s sales in segment b (at price prA  v   ) are equal to:
DrA =

1
2
rA (1  oB) +
1
2
rA
o
B Pr(p
r
A +  < p
o
B)

:
The same analysis applies to obtain rm B0s demand DrB in segment a (at price p
r
B  v )
and rm B0s sales DoB in segment b (at price p
o
B  v).
As there is no leakage, the two segments are totally independent. For a given strategy of the
rival rm, rm i0s expected prot conditional on ads and prices targeted to segment k = o; r; is
equal to
Eki = p
k
iD
k
i  A

ki

:
Look rst at segment a. Captive consumers to rm A are only aware of poA; while captive
consumers to rm B are only aware of prB: The selective consumers in segment a know both p
o
A
and prB: Firm is expected prot in its own strong market, denoted E
o
i ; is given by:
Eoi = p
o
i
oi
2
 
1  rj

+ rj Pr(p
o
i < p
r
j + )
 A (oi ) : (4)
Similarly, rm i0s expected prot in the rivals market (i.e. rm i0s weak market), denoted
Eri ; is given by:
Eri = p
r
i
ri
2

(1  oj) + oj Pr
 
pri +  < p
o
j
 A (ri ) : (5)
In each segment k; given rm j0s advertising and pricing strategy, rm i chooses the adver-
tising level (ki ) and the price (p
k
i ) in order to maximize its expected prot dened by (4), in
the case of its strong market, and by (5) in the case of its weak market.
Proposition 4. There is no symmetric price equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5. When target is perfect and price discrimination is permitted there is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in which:
(i) Regarding the strong market, each rm i; i = A;B chooses a price randomly from the
distribution F oi (p) given by
F oi (p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p  prjmin + 
1
oi
h
1  (v )(1 oi )p 
i
if prjmin +   p  v
1 if p  v
where prjmin = (v   ) (1   oi ): The advertising reach targeted to the strong market oi is
implicitly given by
1
2
v   oi (v   ) = Aoi (oi ) (6)
or equivalently by,
poimin  
1
2
v = Aoi (
o
i )
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with Aoi (0) <
1
2v: The equilibrium prot in this market is:
Eoi = 
o
i Aoi (
o
i ) +
1
2
(oi )
2 (v   ) A (oA ) : (7)
(ii) Regarding the weak market, each rm chooses a price randomly from the distribution
F ri (p) given by
F ri (p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p  prjmin
1
ri
h
1  v(1 
o
j )+
o
j
p+
i
if prjmin  p  v   
1 if p  v   
The advertising reach targeted to the weak market ri is implicitly given by
1
2
(v   )  1
2
oj (v   ) = Ari (ri ) ; (8)
or, equivalently by,
1
2
prjmin = Ari

r

i

; (9)
where oj solves condition (6) and Ari (0) <
1
2
 
1  oj

(v   ) : The corresponding equilibrium
prot in this market is:
Eri = 
r
i Ari (
r
i ) A (ri ) : (10)
Proof.
See the Appendix.
Corollary 2. When target is perfect and rms use the quadratic technology with A(ki ) =

 
ki
2
; under (A1) and (A2), for   (5v 9)1=2(v )1=2 (v )8 , there is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in which the rms equilibrium advertising intensity targeted to their own strong
market is given by:
o =
v
4+ 2 (v   ) ;
yielding equilibrium prots equal to
Eo =
v2
8 (v + 2  ) :
For the weak market segment each rm chooses an advertising level r given by
r =
v   
4
v + 4  2
4+ 2 (v   ) ; (11)
and rm i0s expected prot in this market segment is equal to:
Eri = 

v   
8
v + 4  2
v + 2  
2
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
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Assumption 2. In order to guarantee that the conditions in Corollary 2 are met, in the
remainder of the analysis we shall assume that conditions (A1) and (A2) hold, where (A2) is
dened as follows:
(A2): max
(
(5v   9)1=2 (v   )1=2   (v   )
8
;

 p
2 + 1

4
)
   (v   3) (v   )
8
:
Corollary 3. When rms use targeted advertising as a price discrimination device, under
Assumptions 1 and 2, each rm advertises less to its own (strong) market than to the rivals
market, i.e., o < r:
Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the practical implications of the previous result, consider, for instance, the
case of a co¤ee shop (or any other store) that is running a location based targeted advertising
campaign in a specic predened area (geofence) as a way to create awareness for a new o¤er
and drive consumers to take actions locally. The model suggests that this co¤ee shop will send
more ads to consumers located closer to the competitor shop (weak market) than to consumers
who are located near its shop (strong market).
Corollary 4. From Proposition 5 and condition (A1) in Assumption 1, it follows that
F ri (v   ) = 
o
r
 v 
v

: As o < r; F ri (v   ) < 1: Thus, F ri has a mass point at (v   )
equal to:
mr = 1  
o
r

v   
v

:
Proof. See the Appendix.
In light of Corollary 4, it can be said that each rm uses a Hi-Lopricing strategy in the
rivals strong market. To squeeze more surplus from its weak captive customers, it charges the
highest price v   ; with probability mr:29 However, in order to poach the selective customers
in its weak market, it occasionally quotes a low price. From Corollary 4 we can observe that mr
is increasing in r, and decreasing in o: When, say, rm i decreases the advertising reach in
its strong market, the size of rm js group of weak captive customers increases, because less
consumers become aware of both rms. Thus, by decreasing the advertising e¤ort in its strong
market, rm i induces rm j to play less aggressively in this segment of the market.
Corollary 3 states that rms advertise more in its weak market than in its strong market.
This nding is in contrast with Galeotti and Moraga-González (2008); Iyer, et al. (2005) and
Brahim, et al. (2011) who nd the reverse. In our framework each rm has an incentive
to strategically reduce the advertising intensity to be targeted to its strong market as a way
to induce the rival to play less aggressively in this market. To better understand the intuition
29Note that for the quadratic advertising cost function F ri (v   ) = 44+v 2 : As v > 2; it is always true that
F ri (v   ) < 1: Therefore, mr = v 24+v 2
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behind this advertising strategy, it is useful to take into account the rmsequilibrium conditions
regarding advertising decisions. Consider the case of segment i: In this segment the level of oi
is implicitly given by
1
2
v   oi (v   ) = Aoi (oi ) : (12)
From (12) it follows that rm i0s advertising reach in its strong market, oi ; is independent of
rm j0s advertising intensity in this market (rj). In contrast, rm js equilibrium advertising
decision in segment i (its weak market) is implicitly given by the following condition:
1
2
(v   )  1
2
oi (v   ) = Arj
 
rj

: (13)
The previous condition highlights the strategic substitutability between rj and 
o
i . The lower
is oi the higher is 
r
j : Thus when rm i decreases 
o; it induces rm j to increase rj due to
the strategic substitutability property. Additionally, we have seen that a decrease in oi induces
rm j to play less aggressively in prices in rm is strong market. When oi decreases, both
prjmin and the mass point m
r increase. Thus, by reducing oi , rm i increases the probability of
rm j charging v   ; and serving only its group of captive consumers in segment i: Although
rm i ends up with less captive consumers than rm j in its strong market, the increase in mr;
increases the probability of rm i also serving all the selective consumers in its strong market.
Proposition 6. With perfect targeting and price discrimination:
(i) each rm wins the group of selective customers in its own market with a probability equal
to  2 [0; 1] where
 =
Z v 
prmin
 Z pB+
pomin
fo (po) dpo
!
f (pr) dpr +mr:
The quadratic technology yields:
 =
4 (v + 4  )


1
v + 4  2  
1


ln
v + 4  
v + 4  2

+
5
4+ 5
:
(ii) For the quadratic technology, the expected price targeted to own and the rivals customers
are, respectively:
Eo(p) =
(v + 4  2)
v

(v   )    p
r
min ln p
r
min
prmin
  (   (ln (v   )) (v   ))

Er(p) =
4 (v + 4  )

vpomin ln

v
pomin

   (v   pomin)

pomin (v   ) (v + 4  2)
+
(v   )(v   2)
v + 4  2 ;
where pomin = ( + p
r
min) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 5. When the marginal advertising cost  increases:
(i) o and r decrease;
(ii) the minimum price in the equilibrium support of both c.d.f F r(p) and F o(p) increases.
(iii) the mass point mr decreases.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
For the quadratic advertising cost function and the numerical example where v = 7 and
 = 1; assumption (A2) is satised when max f0:81125; 0:60355g    3: Figure 1 plots the
expected price targeted to old and the rivals customers as a function of advertising costs.
0 1 2 3
5.0
5.5
6.0
Advertising Costs
Expected prices
E(p)_o
E(p)_r
Figure 1: Expected Prices
For this numerical example it is interesting to note that when advertising is not too cheap,
on average rms target ads with better deals to consumers in the weak market than to those
consumers in the strong market. This result conrms the usual nding that price discrimination
leads rms to charge more to their own customers than to their rivals customers. The numerical
example considered shows however that it may happen that ads targeted to a rms weak
market quote on average a higher price than ads targeted to the rms strong market. When
advertising is too cheap each rm sends increasingly more ads to consumers in the rivals strong
market, which increases the group of its weak captive consumers (see gure 5) and with a higher
probability it will decide to focus on this group of captive consumers, o¤ering them the price
v   : This increases the average price to be quoted to group of captives in the weak market.
5 Competitive e¤ects of targeted advertising
This section investigates how targeted advertising and price discrimination a¤ect the equilibrium
outcomes i.e., advertising intensities, prices and prots. To perform comparative statics, we
have to resort to a numerical analysis. We use the quadratic advertising cost function and assume
that v = 7 and  = 1: In this case assumption (A2) is satised when max f0:81125; 0:60355g 
  3:
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E¤ects on Advertising We have seen that with targeted advertising rms advertise less
intensively in its own market than in the rivals market (i.e., o < r). With mass advertising
rms choose an intensity of advertising to the whole market, which in equilibrium is equal to
m: Figure 2 depicts advertising intensities for di¤erent values of the marginal advertising cost
.
0 1 2 3
0.0
0.5
1.0
Advertising Costs
Advertising
Adv._o
Adv_m
Adv_r
Figure 2: Advertising intensities
Figure 3 shows that in the case of mass advertising technologies, advertising expenditures
are monotonically increasing with , while with targeted advertising, advertising expenditures
are monotonically decreasing with : It also shows that when  is high enough total advertising
costs with targeted advertising can be below its counterparts with mass advertising. The nding
that total advertising costs with targeted advertising are below those with mass advertising is
also obtained in Brahim, et al. (2011) and Iyer, et al. (2005), and it can be partly explained by
the fact that all of these models consider quadratic additive targeted advertising technologies.
However, it is important to stress that our analysis reveals that the additive property is not
su¢ cient to originate lower total advertising costs with targeted advertising. If  is su¢ ciently
low Figure 3 shows that in our model rms can spend more on advertising when they use targeted
advertising than when they use mass advertising.
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Figure 3: Total advertising costs
E¤ects on market segmentation Regarding the e¤ects of targeted advertising on market
segmentation it is worth noting that when advertising is not too cheap, for the numerical example
considered, more consumers are informed with mass advertising than with targeted advertising.
This implies that as advertising becomes more expensive more consumers are left out of the
market with targeted advertising. Figure 5 shows that the group of selective consumers with
targeted advertising is also below its mass advertising counterpart. Additionally, the fraction of
consumers who are only aware of the less preferred rm is higher under targeted than under mass
advertising. This means that, in our framework, targeted advertising might lead to a less e¢ cient
shopping to some consumers. This result will be useful to understand the negative e¤ects of
targeted advertising on consumer welfare discussed in section 6. This nding is in contrast with
Brahim et al. (2011) in which targeted advertising always leads to a more e¢ cient shopping
for all consumers. The rationale for our result lies on the rmsoptimal pricing strategies when
price discrimination is feasible. More precisely it lies on rmsstrategic incentives to reduce the
advertising intensity in the strong market as a way to induce the rival to price less aggressively
in this market.
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Figure 4: Informed consumers
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Figure 5: Market segmentation
E¤ects on Prices Even though it is not possible to establish a general stochastic ordering
between Fm, F r and F o. Figures 6-8 plot these distribution functions for the parameters
identied above.
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Figure 6: Distribution Functions ( = 3)
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Figure 7: Distribution Functions ( = 2)
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Figure 8: Distribution Functions ( = 1)
For the numerical example considered, the gures show that Fm is stochastically dominated
by F r and F o: This suggests that average prices with targeted advertising and price discrimi-
nation can be, above the average price with mass advertising and no discrimination.30 This is
an interesting result because it challenges the usual nding that in a competitive setting price
discrimination generally reduces prices in all segments of the market (e.g. Thisse and Vives
(1988), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). The reason is that in our framework targeted advertising
30 It is important to stress that the same pattern was obtained for other values of  satisfying assumptions (A1)
and (A2). Details are available from authors upon request.
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softens price competition and allows rms to raise prices. These gures also suggest that the
stochastic dominance of F r and F o over Fm is expected to be more signicant as advertising
becomes cheaper.
E¤ects on prots From the equilibrium solutions and assuming that conditions (A1)
and (A2) are satised we have that each rms prots with targeted and mass advertising are
respectively given by
Et =

2+ v   
2

A (o) +A (r)
and
Em = A (m) :
Proposition 7. Taking into account that condition (A2) is satised, targeted advertising
and price discrimination boost each rms prots when  is such that the following implicit
condition is satised
2 [1   (; v; )] + (v   ) > 0,
with  (; v; ) = (
m)2 (r)2
(o)2
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 9 plots each rms prots with targeted advertising (Prot_T) and with mass adver-
tising (Prot_M) for the numerical example considered. For this example, we see that prots
with targeted advertising and price discrimination are above their mass advertising counterparts
when  < 2:4605; while the reverse happens when  > 2:4605:
Proposition 7 highlights that price discrimination by means of targeted advertising does not
necessarily lead to the classic prisoner dilemma result that arises in models with full informed
consumers. A common nding in models with (i) full informed consumers, (ii) best-response
asymmetry and (iii) all rms engaging in price discrimination, is that equilibrium prots decrease
with price discrimination (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000),
Esteves (2010), Gehrig, et al. (2012)). In contrast, this paper shows that price discrimination
can boost prots even when conditions (ii) and (iii) hold.
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Figure 9: Prots
Proposition 7 suggests that in our framework equilibrium prots with targeted advertising
are above their mass advertising counterparts for not too high advertising costs, the reverse
happens for high advertising costs. This result is in contrast with Iyer, et al. (2005) who
argue that targeting always increases rmsprots. The reason is that in their model targeting
is always oriented to consumers who have a strong preference for the rms product. Our
result is also di¤erent from Brahim, et al. (2010) who show that when rms advertise to their
strong and weak market, prots with targeted advertising are always above those with mass
advertising. Although in their model price discrimination is not permitted, they argue that
if price discrimination were introduced in their framework the negative e¤ects of targeted on
prots would still be present (p. 686).
For the numerical example considered, it is possible to say something about the impact of
advertising costs on equilibrium prots. First, Figure 9 shows that with mass advertising and
uniform pricing, rms benet from increases in advertising costs. This conrms a well-known
result in the literature on informative advertising: rmsprots may increase with advertising
costs (e.g. Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stahl (1994), Esteves (2009)). In general, whilst an
increase in advertising costs has a negative direct e¤ect on prots, there is, as well, a strategic
e¤ect : as advertising costs increase, rms respond with less advertising, and prices go up. When
the strategic e¤ect dominates, prots may increase with advertising costs. If we start with a
situation in which m is low ( is high), additional advertising is more likely to increase the
fraction of captive customers than the fraction of selective customers. It turns out that the
probability of reaching an uninformed buyer is high and, then, rms have more incentives to
focus on the group of captive consumers, thereby quoting high prices. However, as  becomes
increasingly smaller and rms advertise more, the reverse happens.
Second, Figure 9 shows that with targeted advertising and price discrimination, rms are
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always better o¤ with decreases in advertising costs. This establishes that when price discrim-
ination through targeted advertising is allowed, prots and advertising costs move in opposite
directions. Following the previous reasoning, this suggests that the direct e¤ect is stronger than
the strategic e¤ect. A decrease in , increases r and the group of rm js captive consumers
in market i increases. Consequently, rm j plays less aggressively in rm is strong market
with a positive e¤ect on both rmsprots. Under no discrimination, a reduction in advertising
costs tends to push rms to price more aggressively leading to lower average prices. Expressed
di¤erently, without discrimination, an increase in  has the strategic e¤ect of reducing the group
of selective consumers, which avoids a more aggressive behavior, thereby increasing the rms
prots. In contrast, with price discrimination, a decrease in  has the strategic e¤ect of increas-
ing the rival rms captive group of consumers which increases the probability of the rival rm
charging the highest price v  . This acts to soften price competition and therefore to increase
prots.
6 Welfare analysis
This section investigates the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination enabled by informative
targeted advertising. In our set-up, total welfare can be written as v expected disutility
cost advertising costs.
Consider rst the mass advertising/no discrimination case. Recall that customers gross
benet when buying a certain good can be given by v expected disutility cost, where the latter
is equal to ; when the consumer buys the least preferred good; and zero, when the consumer
buys the most preferred good. In the social optimal solution, consumers would buy from the most
preferred rm, in order to obtain a gross benet of v (and minimize the expected disutility cost).
Taking into account the equilibrium market segmentation with mass advertising, we have that
the rmscaptive consumers in their strong market always buy e¢ ciently. In contrast, captive
consumers who are only aware of the least preferred product always buy ine¢ ciently because
they incur the disutility cost : Finally, regarding the group of selective consumers, they buy
e¢ ciently when rms share them equally, which occurs with probability qm:With the remaining
probability, 1  qm; all the selective consumers buy from the same rm, which means that half
of them buy ine¢ ciently. Accordingly, in the case of mass advertising/no discrimination, total
welfare can be represented as:
Wm = m (1  m) (2v   ) + v (m)2   
2
(1  qm) (m)2   2A(m): (14)
Expected consumer surplus is ECSm = Wm   Emind. As in equilibrium Em = A (m) ; it
follows that Emind = 2A (
m) : Thus,
ECSm = m (1  m) (2v   ) + v (m)2   
2
(1  qm) (m)2   4A(m) (15)
Look now at the targeted advertising/price discrimination case. Selective consumers buy
e¢ ciently when each rm wins the group of selective consumers in its strong market, which
occurs with probability  . Regarding the segments of captive consumers, those that buy the
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most preferred product obtain a gross utility of v; while those consumers who are only aware of
the less preferred brand obtain a gross utility of v   : Accordingly, with targeted advertising
overall welfare is given by:
W t= vo (1  r)+ (v   )r (1  o)+vor+(v   ) (1  )or 2A (o) 2A (r)
which simplies to
W t = vo + (v   )r (1  o)  or (1  )  2A (o)  2A (r) : (16)
Expected consumer surplus is equal to ECSt =W t Etind: From Et =

2+v 
2

A (o)+
A (r) it follows that
Etind =

2+ v   


A (o) + 2A (r) :
This yields:
ECSt = vo (1  r)+ (v   )r (1  o)+ (v  + )or 

v + 4  


A (o)  4A (r) :
(17)
Figure 10 plot overall welfare and expected consumer surplus for the numerical example
considered. It shows that consumerssurplus and overall welfare decrease when we move from
mass advertising/no discrimination to targeted advertising/price discrimination.
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Figure 10: Welfare and Consumer Surplus
At least for the numerical example considered, when advertising is not too expensive tar-
geted advertising and price discrimination can boost industry prots at the expense of social
welfare and consumer welfare. When advertising costs are high, targeted advertising and price
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discrimination are bad for prots as well as for consumersand overall welfare. The result that
price discrimination can benet industry prots and hurt consumers departs from the general
presumption of Chen (2005), according to whom price discrimination ... is by and large unlikely
to raise signicant antitrust concerns. In fact, as the economics literature suggests, such pricing
practices in oligopoly markets often intensify competition and potentially benet consumers.
(p. 123).
The welfare results obtained highlight the importance of taking into account di¤erent forms
of market competition when public policy tries to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of price discrimi-
nation in competitive settings. This suggests that competition authorities should be particularly
vigilant with regards to targeted advertising and price discrimination in industries wherein rms
have nowadays the tools to personalise their ads and pricing o¤ers.
7 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the e¤ects of price discrimination by means of targeted advertising
in a duopolistic market in which advertising plays two major roles: it is used by rms as a
way to transmit relevant information to otherwise uninformed consumers, and it is used as a
price discrimination device. Two advertising and pricing strategies were studied in the paper:
a mass advertising/non-discrimination strategy and a targeted advertising/price discrimination
strategy.
Under mass advertising rms choose an intensity of advertising to the entire market and all
the ads announce the same price. When price discrimination by means of targeted advertising
is used, rms choose di¤erent levels of advertising to each market segment, and ads targeted to
di¤erent segments quote a di¤erent price.
The paper o¤ers a contribution to the literature on competitive price discrimination and
to the literature on targeted informative advertising. It has shown that rms advertise less
intensively to its strong market than to its weak market. This nding is in contrast with
Galeotti and Moraga-González (2008), Iyer et al. (2005) and Brahim et al. (2011) who nd the
opposite result. The reason is that in our framework each rm has an incentive to strategically
reduce the advertising intensity to be targeted to its strong market, as a way to induce the
rival to play less aggressively. We also nd that targeted advertising may lead to less e¢ cient
shopping to some consumers. This result di¤ers from Brahim et al. (2011), in which targeted
advertising always leads to a more e¢ cient shopping for all consumers.
The stylized model addressed in this paper has also provided new insights to the literature on
price discrimination based on customer recognition. If rms need to invest in advertising to cre-
ate awareness for their products, we nd that prices with mass advertising (non-discrimination)
can be, on average, below those with targeted advertising. This is an interesting nding as it
challenges the usual result that price discrimination reduces all segment prices. We also nd
that price discrimination by means of targeted informative advertising does not necessarily lead
to the classic prisoner dilemma result arising in models with full informed consumers and ex-
hibiting best-response asymmetry. Our analysis reveals that, at least when advertising is not
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too expensive, each rmsprot with targeted advertising and price discrimination is above its
non-discrimination counterpart.
The nding that prots with targeted advertising can be above their mass advertising coun-
terparts for not too high advertising costs, and below those levels for high advertising costs
departs from Iyer, et al. (2005) who argue that targeting always increases rmsprots. The
reason is that in their model targeting is always oriented to consumers who have a strong prefer-
ence for their product. Our result also departs from Brahim et al. (2011) who show that prots
with mass advertising are always above the targeting prots when rms advertise to their strong
and weak markets.
Finally, another relevant contribution of the paper was to investigate the welfare e¤ects
of targeted advertising with price discrimination in comparison to the mass advertising/no-
discrimination case. We showed that, at least when advertising costs are not too high, price
discrimination by means of targeted advertising can boost industry prots at the expense of
consumer surplus and welfare. Thus, the paper has highlighted the importance of taking into
account di¤erent forms of market competition when public policy tries to evaluate the prot
and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination and targeted advertising.
In light of the above, this paper has tried to contribute to the debate on the economic
implications of targeted advertising and pricing with customer recognition. Notwithstanding the
model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex aspects of real markets, it has tried
to o¤er a closer approximation of reality, where the quantity and quality of consumer-specic
information that rms have been using to implement their advertising and pricing strategies is
increasingly improving thanks to the advances in information technologies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Look rst at case (i). Suppose (v; v) is an equilibrium in pure
strategies. In this case rm i serves only the captive and the selective consumers who belong to
its strong market, obtaining a prot equal to 12vi 2i :When (v; v) constitutes an equilibrium
in pure strategies, the corresponding equilibrium advertising level is equal to
i =
v
4
;
where we must impose
 >
v
4
(18)
to guarantee an interior solution in the advertising choice. Equilibrium prots for each rm are
then equal to (vi )
 = 116
v2
 : Any price greater than v is not part of an equilibrium strategy since
at such a price no consumer is willing to buy from the rm. Any price lower than v but greater
than v   gives rm i the same market share but reduces its prot and so it is dominated by v:
If rm i deviates and chooses pdi = v  ; the rm starts selling its good to the group of captive
consumers in its weak market. Firm i0s prots are then
d;v i = (v   )

i
 
1  j

+
1
2
ij

  2i ;
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where j =
1
4
v
 ; since rm i takes as given rm j
0 s decisions (pricing and advertising). The
deviation advertising reach would then be equal to d;v i =
(8 v)(v )
162
as long as v < 8: This
condition guarantees d;v i is positive and it always holds under (18). The condition  >
(v 4)2
v 8
would guarantee d;v i is smaller than 1. For v < 8; the RHS of the last condition is always
negative and therefore the condition is always true. Thus, when  > v4 ; rm i
0s deviation prot
is equal to d;v i =
1


(v )(v 8)
16
2
. Comparing d;v i and (
v
i )
 ; we obtain the following
no-deviation condition:
 <
v (v   )
4 (v   2) : (19)
Accordingly, the conditions  > v4 and  <
v(v )
4(v 2) are necessary for (v; v) to be a Nash
Equilibrium in Pure Strategies. Considering the two conditions simultaneously, it follows that
when v < 2; (v; v) is a pure strategy equilibrium if  > v4 : When v > 2; (v; v) is a pure
strategy equilibrium in prices if v4 <  <
v(v )
4(v 2) :
Finally, it remains to study if instead of deviating to v   ; rm i would be interested
in decreasing its price even further, serving not only all the captive consumers but also all
selective consumers, by setting pi = v      " > 0: In that case, rm i0s prots are equal to
(v      ")i   2i , leading rm i to choose an advertising intensity equal to v  "2 as long as
 > v  "2 :
The deviation prots are equal to d;v  "i =
1
4
(v  ")2
 . As long as v > 2; it is always
possible to nd a su¢ ciently small " for which d;v  "i > (
v
i )
 ; which means that the deviation
from v to v   " is always protable when v > 2: In contrast, when v < 2; such deviation is
never protable. When v < 2; we always have v  "2 <
v
4 and therefore condition  >
v  "
2
always holds as long as  > v4 :
Accordingly, (v; v) is an interior Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies iif v < 2 and  > 14v:
Addressing now case (ii), suppose (v   ; v   ) is an equilibrium in pure strategies. In
this case, rm i serves all its captive consumers as well as the selective consumers in its strong
market. Firm i0s prot for a given advertising intensity i write as (v   )

i   ij2

  2i ,
and rmsequilibrium advertising reach is then given by v i = 2
v 
v +4as long as
 >
v   
4
: (20)
The equilibrium prots are (v i )
 = 4 (v )
2
(v+4 )2 : If rm i deviates to a higher price it
must be to price v: In this case, rm i only sells to consumers in its strong market (captive and
selective). Prots are given by 12vi   2i and the deviation advertising reach is equal to v4 ;
which is an interior solution when (20) holds. Deviation prots are equal to (d;vi )
 = 116
v2
 :
Firm i does not have incentives to deviate to price v if (d;vi )
 < (v i )
; or equivalently,
 > v(v )4(v 2) for v > 2:Note that the previous condition on  is more restrictive than (20).
Consider next a deviation to a lower price. If rm i deviates and chooses pdi = v 2 " > 0
it can also attract the group of selective consumers belonging to its weak market. In this case,
rm i0s prot writes as (v   2   ")i   2i , and rm is deviation advertising reach is then
given by d;v 2 "i =
v 2 "
2 : Deviation prots are equal to 
d;v 2 "
i =
(v 2 ")2
4 :
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The deviation to v   2   " is unprotable if d;v 2 "i < (v i ); or equivalently  >
v 
4
v 2
 :
Thus, (v   ; v   ) is an equilibrium in pure strategies if:
 > max

(v   2) (v   )
4
;
v (v   )
4 (v   2)

.
In case (iii), the conditions above do not hold and the game has no symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium in prices. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that rm j selects a price randomly from the c.d.f
Fj(p): For the sake of simplicity write Fi(p) = Fj(p) = F (p). Suppose further that the support
of the equilibrium prices is [pmin; pmax]. When rm i chooses any price that belongs to the
equilibrium support of prices, and rm j uses the c.d.f F (p); rm is expected prot is always
equal to a constant, which is denoted km minus advertising costs. When rm i charges price
pi  v   ; rm is expected prot, denoted Ei; is
Ei = pi
 
1  j

+ pij

1  1
2
Fj (p+ )  1
2
Fj (p  )

 A(i)
In a MSNE we must observe that:
pi

i
 
1  j

+ ij

1  1
2
Fj (pi + )  1
2
Fj(pi   )

 A (i) = km  A (i) ;
from which we obtain
Fj (pi + ) + Fj(pi   ) = 2  2k
m
ijpi
+
2
 
1  j

j
(21)
Suppose that p1 is such that p1    = pmin and p2 is such that p2 +  = pmax: Then, 8p  p1;
F (p  ) = 0 and 8p  p2; F (p+ ) = 1:Using (21) it follows that
8p  p1 ) Fj (pi + ) = 2  2k
m
ijpi
+
2
 
1  j

j
and
8p  p2 ) Fj(pi   ) = 1  2k
m
ijpi
+
2
 
1  j

j
Thus,
8p  p1 ) F (p) = 2  2k
m
ij (p  )
+
2
 
1  j

j
Similarly,
8p  p2 ) F (p) = 1  2k
m
ij (p+ )
+
2
 
1  j

j
Now it remains to show that p1 = p2: Suppose rst that p2 < p1: Then, 8p 2 [p2; p1] it follows
F (p  ) = 0 and F (p+ ) = 1 thus p i  1  j+ 12ij = km:
Assume now that p2 > p1 and take p 2 [p1; p2] s.t. (21) holds. 9ep s.t. ep   = pL < p1 andep+  = pH > p2:
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Since pL < p1 and pH > p2; it follows that
F (ep) = 2  2
ij

km
(ep  )   i  1  j

and
F (ep) = 1  2
ij

kmep+    i  1  j

:
From the continuity of F it must be true that
2  2
ij

km
(ep  )   i  1  j

= 1  2
ij

kmep+    i  1  j

;
from which it follows that there is a unique positive value of ep given by ep =q4kmij + 2.
Since this must hold 8p 2 [p1; p2] and they cannot all be equal it must be the case that
p1 = p2: Since p1 = pmin+ and p2 = pmax  it follows that pmin+ = pmax  or equivalently
pmax   pmin = 2:
Let p be the price of rm i, then given that pmax pmin = 2; it follows that for any p  v ;
F (p) is equal to
F (p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p < pmin
1  2ij

km
p+   i
 
1  j

if pmin 5 p 5 pmax   
2  2ij

km
p    i
 
1  j

if pmax    < p 5 pmax
1 if p > pmax
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(22)
As in the symmetric MSNE, i = j = ; the c.d.f F (p) can be written as:
Fm(p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p < pmin
1  2
(m)2

km
p+   m (1  m)

if pmin 5 p 5 pmax   
2  2
(m)2

km
p    m (1  m)

if pmax    < p 5 pmax
1 if p > pmax
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
;
From F (pmin) = 0 and F (pmax) = 1 it follows that
1  2
ij

km
pmin + 
  i
 
1  j

= 0() 2k
m
ij + 2i
 
1  j
    = pmin
and
2  2
ij

km
pmax      i
 
1  j

= 1
Thus we obtain that:
pmax =
2km
2i   ij
+  (23)
By continuity, for p = pmax    = 2km2i ij ; it must be true that:
2ij (k
m)2 
2i   ij
2   2km   ij2 2 = 0
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yielding:
km =
i
2j
 
2  j
2 
1 +
q
1 + 2j
 
2  j
 2
: (24)
Thus,
pmax = 
2  j
j

1 +
q
1 + 2j
 
2  j
 2
+ : (25)
The expected prot of rm i; Ei = km  A (i) is equal to
Ei =
1
2
i (pmax   )
 
2  j
 A (i) :
For 0 < i < 1 (interior solution), each rms advertising equilibrium level with mass
advertising is obtained by maximizing Ei in order to i: From the rst order condition, the
interior solution is given by31 @k
m
@i
= Ai (i) which under symmetry writes as
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = A (m) : (26)

Proof of Corollary 1. Considering the quadratic advertising technology, A (m) =  (m)2 ;
the equation (26) writes as:
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = 2m: (27)
Substituting pmax by (25) and solving for m; we obtain the equilibrium advertising level
given by:
m = 2
 
2 + 8
1=2
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
: (28)
Note that equation (27) had an additional solution, given by  = 2
p
2+8p
2+8 4 : However, it
can be easily seen that such solution cannot dene the optimal advertising level in an interior
solution since it would always lead to  > 1: Simple algebra shows that m in equation (28)
denes the interior optimal advertising level as long as  
p
2+1
4 ; which is always the case
under condition (A2) in Assumption 1.
Plugging the optimal value of m in equation (25), we get:
pmax =
 
2 + 8
1=2
+ ;
and, for v > 2; we have pmax  v  under under condition (A2) in Assumption 1, in particular
when   (v )(v 3)8 and v > 2:
Analogously, replacing m by (28) in equation (24) , we obtain
km =
8 (8+ )h
4+ (2 + 8)1=2
i2 :
31Note that the second order condition is satised. It is given by  A (m) < 0; which is always true, given
our assumptions with respect to the advertising technology.
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Substituting the resulting values for pmax and km in the c.d.f function (22), we obtain
Fm(p) equal to:8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p <
 
2 + 8
1=2   
4
h 
2 + 8
 1=2   1p+ i if  2 + 81=2     p   2 + 81=2
1  4
h
1
p   
 
2 + 8
 1=2i
if
 
2 + 8
1=2  p <  2 + 81=2 + 
1 if p   2 + 81=2 + 
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
:
Finally, substituting the optimal advertising choice (28) in the equilibrium expected prots,
Em = mA (
m) A (m) ; equal to Em =  (m)2 ; we obtain:
Em =
4
 
2 + 8
h
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
i2
as stated in Corollary 1. To end the proof, it remains to verify that the domain
(
p
2+1)
4 
  (v 3)(v )8 in Corollary 1 is not empty. For that to be the case, we must observe v > p
2 + 3

:
Proof of Proposition 3 Let q 2 [0; 1] represent the probability with which each rm
serves its group of selective customers. Because the model is symmetric both rms have the
same support of prices. Then q can be written as:
q = 1  2
Z pmax
pmin+
Z pA 
pmin
f (pB) dpB

f (pA) dpA
from which we obtain:
qm = 1 +
8 (km)2
(m)4
"
1
(pmax   )2
  ln
 
(pmax   )2
pmax (pmax   2)
!#
:
Replacing km, m and pmax by the equilibrium values described in Corollary 1, we obtain
the result in Proposition 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Look at rm i0s strong market. In this case poi  v and prj  v :
Suppose that (v; v ) is an equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider when indi¤erent consumers
choose the rm they prefer. In this case rm i serves both the captive and selective consumers
in its strong market while rm j serves its captive consumers in this market. Firm is prots in
this market are:
Eoi = v
oi
2
 A (oi ) : (29)
Firm j0s prots in the rivals market (i.e. rm i0s strong market), denoted Eri ; is given by:
Erj = (v   )
ri (1  oj)
2
 A (ri ) : (30)
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Taking into account rm is price and advertising decisions, if rm j deviates to prj = v      "
it poaches all the selective consumers in market i: The prot from deviation would be equal to
d;v  "j = (v      ")
ri
2
 A (ri ) :
(v      ")y
2
  (v   )y(1  x)
2
> 0
Thus, it is always possible to nd a su¢ ciently small " for which d;v  "j > E
r
j :
Proof of Proposition 5. Here we prove that there is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed
strategies in prices for an interior pure strategy equilibrium in advertising. As we focus on
symmetric MSNE in prices, the c.d.f. are such that F oA(p) = F
o
B(p) = F
o (p) ; and F rB(p) =
F rA(p) = F
r (p) : Accordingly, for the sake of simplicity, with no loss of generality, we restrict
our attention to rmsdecisions in segment a; obtaining F oA(p) = F
o (p) and F rB(p) = F
r (p) :
Given rmspricing and advertising strategies targeted to segment a, rm As expected prot
in this segment, denoted EoA is equal to
EoA = p
o
A

1
2
oA (1  rB) +
1
2
oA
r
B Pr(p
o
A < p
r
B + )

 A (oA)
or equivalently,
EA = p
o
A

1
2
oA (1  rB) +
1
2
oA
r
B [1  F rB(poA   )]

 A (oA) ;
Similarly rm Bs expected prot in segment a, denoted ErB; is
ErB =
1
2
prB frB(1  oA) + rBoA [1  F oA (prB + )]g  A (rB) :
Note that the minimum price rm B is willing to charge even when it is assured of getting
the entire segment of selective customers in market a should satisfy the following condition
1
2
prBmin
r
B =
1
2
(v   )rB(1  oA);
from which we obtain:
prBmin = (v   ) (1  oA): (31)
Given that rm B would never want to price below prBmin; it is a dominated strategy for rm
A to price below prBmin + : Thus, the support of equilibrium prices for rm A is [p
r
Bmin + ; v]
while for rm B is [prBmin; v   ] : As usual in a MSNE each rm must be indi¤erent between
charging any price in the support of equilibrium prices.
For rm B we must observe that for any prBmin  prB  v    :
1
2
prB
r
B f(1  oA) + oA [1  F oA (prB + )]g =
1
2
(v   )rB(1  oA)
which simplies to
F oA (p+ ) =
1
oA

1  (v   ) (1  
o
A)
p

or, F oA (p) =
1
oA

1  (v   ) (1  
o
A)
p  

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where F oA (v) = 1: Note also that F
o
A (p
r
Bmin + ) = 0. In this way
F oA (p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p  prBmin + 
1
oA
h
1  (v )(1 oA)p 
i
if prBmin +   p  v
1 if p  v
9>>=>>; :
Analogously, for rm A we must observe that for any prBmin +   poA  v :
EoA =
1
2
poA
o
A f(1  rB) + rB [1  F rB(poA   )]g =
1
2
(prBmin + )
o
A (32)
This simplies to
F rB(p  ) =
1
rB

1  p
r
Bmin + 
p

or, F rB(p) =
1
rB

1  p
r
Bmin + 
p+ 

: (33)
Plugging (31) in (33), we obtain
F rB(p) =
1
rB

1  v (1  
o
A) + 
o
A
p+ 

Note that F rB(pBmin) = 0: Thus, the corresponding distribution is
F rB(p) =
8>>><>>>:
0 if p  prBmin
1
rB

1  v(1 
o
A)+
o
A
p+

if prBmin  p  v   
1 if p  v   
9>>>=>>>; : (34)
From (32) and (31) it follows that the expected prot obtained by rm A in market a when
it charges any price in the support of equilibrium prices is equal to:
EA =
1
2
oA [v   (v   )oA]   (oA)2 :
The prot-maximizing advertising intensity is obtained from the condition @EA@oA = 0; which
implies that:
v
2
  (v   )oA = AoA (oA) ; (35)
since the SOC hold under our assumptions about the advertising technology.
Firm i0s equilibrium prot in its strong market is equal to:
Eoi = 
o
iAoi (
o
i ) +
1
2
(oA)
2 (v   ) A (oA) : (36)
To obtain the optimal advertising level rB, recall that rm Bs expected prot in the MSNE
is equal to
EB =
1
2
(v   )rB(1  oA) A (rB) :
As the second order condition @
2EA
@o2A
< 0 is always met, the following rst order condition denes
rm B0s optimal advertising level in segment a
@EB
@rB
= 0) 1
2
(v   ) (1  oA) = Arj

r

j

, 1
2
prjmin = Arj

r

j

: (37)
Firm i0s equilibrium prot in its weak market is equal to:
Eri = 
r
i Ari (
r
i ) A (ri ) :

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Proof of Corollary 2. Considering the quadratic advertising technology, the prot max-
imizing condition for oA (condition (35)) writes as:
v
2
  (v   )oA = 2oA; (38)
yielding:
oA =
v
2 [2+ (v   )] ;
as long as  >  v 24 ; which always holds under assumption (A1). Substituting oA in the
expressions of prBmin and F
o
A (p) ; we obtain:
prBmin = (v   )
v   2 + 4
2v   2 + 4;
and rm i0s equilibrium prot in its strong market is equal to:
Eoi =
1
8
v2
v + 2   :
If we plug prBmin on the equilibrium condition for 
r
B we obtain
rB =
v   
4
v + 4  2
2v + 4  2 ; (39)
which constitutes an interior solution as long as  >
(v )1=2[(5v 9)1=2 (v )1=2]
8 : Accordingly,
rm i0s equilibrium prot in its weak market is given by
Eri =
1


v   
8
v + 4  2
v + 2  
2
:
To nish the proof, it remains to analyze the conditions under which the MSNE prevails.
The previous analysis shows that under (A1) the MSNE in prices leads to interior solutions for
the advertising intensity if and only if  > (5v 9)
1=2(v )1=2 (v )
8 : Combining this assumption
with (A2), we obtain:
max
(
(5v   9)1=2 (v   )1=2   (v   )
8
;

 p
2 + 1

4
)
   (v   3) (v   )
8
;
which together with assumption (A1) dene the conditions under which Corollary 2 holds.
Proof of Corollary 3. Considering the equilibrium advertising levels, simple algebra
shows that oi < 
r
i as long as  <
1
4
(v )(v 2)
 : When  =
1
4
(v )(v 2)
 ; we have 
o
i = 
r
i ;
when  > 14
(v )(v 2)
 ; we have 
o
i > 
r
i : Accordingly, under conditions (A1) and (A2) we
always observe that  < 14
(v )(v 2)
 therefore it is always true that 
o
i < 
r
i :
Proof of Corollary 4. From (34) in the Proof of Proposition 5, it follows that F ri (v  
) = 
o
r
 
1  v

: Substituting the optimal advertising intensities in Proposition 5, we obtain
F ri (v   ) = 4v+4 2 < 1 for v > 2; which is always the case under (A1). 
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Proof of Proposition 6. Each rm serves its group of selective customers at po with
probability given by  2 [0; 1]:
 =
Z v 
prmin
 Z pB+
pomin
fo (po) dpo
!
f (pr) dpr +mr;
or equivalently:
 =
Z v 
prmin
 Z pB+
pomin
 (v   ) (x  1)
x (p  )2 dp
!
x   v (x  1)
y (p+ )2

dpB +m
r
which is equivalent to:
 =
v   
rv

1  1
o

o (v   )  v
2prmin

(v   pomin)  + v (   pomin) ln

pomin
prmin
v   
v

+mr
since pomin = p
r
min + : Substituting 
r; o; prmin and p
o
min by the equilibrium values obtained
in Proposition 5, the result in part (i) of Proposition 6 follows.
We next prove part (ii). For the quadratic technology and from F o and F r dened in
Proposition 5 it is straightforward to nd that:
Eo(p) =
Z v
prjmin+
pfo(p)dp =
Z v
prmin+
p (v   ) (v + 4  2)
v (p  )2 dp
Er(p) =
Z v 
prmin
pf r(p)dp+ (v   )mr =
Z v 
prmin
4pv
(p+ )2 (v   )
v + 4  
v + 4  2 dp+ (v   )m
r
It is easy to obtain that
Eo(p) =
1
vprmin
(v   ) (v + 4  2) (   prmin ln prmin) 
1
v
(v + 4  2) (   (ln (v   )) (v   )) ;
which simplies to
Eo(p) =
(v + 4  2)
v

(v   )    p
r
min ln p
r
min
prmin
  (   (ln (v   )) (v   ))

and
Er(p) =
4 (v + 4  )  prmin   v + 2 + v ln v   vprmin ln (prmin + )  v ln (prmin + ) + vprmin ln v 
prmin + 

(v   ) (v + 4  2)
+
(v   )(v   2)
v + 4  2 ;
which simplies to
Er(p) =
4 (v + 4  )

vpomin ln

v
pomin

   (v   pomin)

pomin (v   ) (v + 4  2)
+
(v   )(v   2)
v + 4  2 :
This completes the proof. 
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Proof of Corollary 5. Consider rst result (i). From Corollary 2, it follows that o =
v
2[2+(v )] ; and 
r = v 4
v+4 2
2v+4 2 , which are both decreasing on  since
@oA
@ =   v(v+2 )2 < 0
and @
r
B
@ =  18 (v   ) 4v 3v+8
2+22 8+v2
2(v+2 )2 < 0: The sign of
@rB
@ depends on the sign of the
polynomial 
 = 4v  3v + 82 + 22   8 + v2
Note that, under condition (A2):
max
(
(5v   9)1=2 (v   )1=2   (v   )
8
;

 p
2 + 1

4
)
   (v   3) (v   )
8
we have 8  (v   3) (v   ) ; or equivalently,
8  v2   4v + 32: (40)
Note also that, 
 can be re-written as follows

 = 4v  3v + 82 + 22   8 + v2
= 4v  4v + v + 82 + 32   2   8 + v2
or equivalently:

 =

v2   4v + 32   8+ 4v+ v + 82   2
=

v2   4v + 32   8+ 4v+  (v   ) + 82
The term in brackets is positive under Assumption (A2), as shown in condition (40). The
other terms are also positive since v > : Therefore @
r
B
@ =  18 (v   ) 
2(v+2 )2 < 0
Regarding result (ii), we have that prBmin = (v   ) v 2+42v 2+4 (see Corollary 2), with
@prBmin
@ =
1
2 (v   ) v+4 2v+2  > 0 and therefore, the minimum price in the equilibrium support of both c.d.f
F r(p) and F o(p) is increasing in the marginal advertising cost :
Finally, concerning result (iii), from Corollary 4 it follows that mr = v 24+v 2 ; with
@mr
@ =
 4 v 2
(v+4 2)2 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 7. From the equilibrium solutions and assuming that (A1) and
(A2) are satised, each rms prots with targeted and mass advertising are given by
Et =

2+ v   
2

A (o) +A (r)
and
Em = A (m) ;
respectively. From Et   Em > 0 we have:
2+ v   
2

A (o) +A (r) A (m) > 0
from which we obtain 
2+ v   
2

>
(m)2   (r)2
(o)2
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Denoting  (; v; ) = (
m)2 (r)2
(o)2
; the previous inequality can be written as:
2+ v    > 2 (; v; )
or, equivalently,
2 [1   (; v; )] + v    > 0:
Otherwise, Em > Et: If 2 [1   (; v; )] + v    = 0 then Et = Em:
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